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Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of
strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evo-
lutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear
relation between average payoffs of players. Although existence and
evolutional stability of ZD strategies have been studied in simple
games, their mathematical properties have not been well-known yet.
For example, what happens when more than one players employ ZD
strategies have not been clarified. In this paper, we provide a general
framework for investigating situations where more than one players
employ ZD strategies in terms of linear algebra. First, we theoreti-
cally prove that a set of linear relations of average payoffs enforced
by ZD strategies always has solutions, which implies that incompati-
ble linear relations are impossible. Second, we prove that linear pay-
off relations are independent of each other under some conditions.
These results hold for general incomplete-information games includ-
ing complete-information games. Furthermore, as an application of
linear algebraic formulation, we provide a simple example of a two-
player game in which one player can simultaneously enforce two lin-
ear relations, that is, simultaneously control her and her opponent’s
average payoffs. All of these results elucidate general mathematical
properties of ZD strategies.
Repeated games | Zero-determinant strategies | Linear algebra
Game theory is a powerful framework explaining rationalbehaviors of human beings (1) and evolutionary behav-
iors of biological systems (2, 3). In a simple example of pris-
oner’s dilemma game, mutual defection is realized as a result
of rational thought, even if mutual cooperation is more favor-
able. On the other hand, when the game is repeated infinite
times, cooperation can be realized if players are far-sighted,
which is confirmed as folk theorem. Axelrod’s famous tourna-
ments on infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (4, 5)
also showed that cooperative but retaliating strategy, called
the tit-for-tat strategy, is successful in the setting of infinitely
repeated game.
Recently, in repeated games with complete information, a
novel class of strategies, called zero-determinant (ZD) strat-
egy, was discovered (6). Surprisingly, ZD strategy unilaterally
enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of all play-
ers. A strategy which unilaterally sets her opponent’s average
payoff (equalizer strategy) is one example. Another example
is extortionate strategy in which the player can earn more
average payoff than her opponent. ZD strategies contain the
well-known tit-for-tat strategy as a special example. After the
pioneering work of Press and Dyson, stability of ZD strategies
has been studied in the context of evolutionary game the-
ory (7–11), and it was found that some kind of ZD strategies,
called generous ZD strategies, can stably exist. Although ZD
strategy was originally formulated in two-player two-action
(iterated prisoner’s dilemma) games, ZD strategy was ex-
tended to multi-player two-action (iterated social dilemma)
games (12, 13), two-player multi-action games (14, 15), and
multi-player multi-action games (16). In addition, ZD strat-
egy was extended to two-player two-action noisy games (17),
which is one example of the repeated incomplete-information
games. Furthermore, besides these fundamental theoretical
studies, ZD strategies are also applied to resource sharing in
wireless networks (18, 19).
The contributions of this paper are four-fold. First, we
extend ZD strategy for general multi-player multi-action re-
peated games with incomplete information, where players
know the structure of games (players, sets of actions of all
players, and payoffs of all players) but cannot observe actions
of other players. A typical example of such situation is auc-
tion. In a sealed-bid auction, a player cannot know actions
(bids) of other players, but only knows the result of the game
(whether she is the winner or not). Second, we prove, in terms
of a linear-algebraic argument, that linear payoff relations en-
forced by players with ZD strategies are consistent, that is,
always have solutions. Third, we introduce the notion of in-
dependence of ZD strategies, and prove, again in terms of
a linear-algebraic argument, that linear payoff relations en-
forced by players with ZD strategies are independent under
a general condition. Fourth, as an application of linear alge-
braic formulation, we provide a simple example of a two-player
game in which one player can simultaneously enforce two lin-
ear relations. This means that she can simultaneously control
her and her opponent’s average payoffs, which has never been
reported in the context of ZD strategies. All of these results
develop deeper understanding of mathematical properties of
.
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ZD strategies in general games.
Setup
We consider an N-player multi-action repeated game, in
which player n ∈ {1, · · · , N} has Mn possible actions, where
Mn is a positive integer. Let σ ≡ (σ1, · · · , σN ) ∈ Σ ≡∏N
n=1
{1, · · · ,Mn} denote a state of the game, which is the
combination of the actions taken by the N players. Let
M ≡
∏N
n=1
Mn be the size of the state space Σ. We assume
that player n decides the next action stochastically accord-
ing to her own previous action σ′n and common information
τ ∈ B with the conditional probability Tˆn (σn|σ
′
n, τ ), where
B is some set. We also define the conditional probability that
common information τ arises when actions of players in the
preceding round are σ′ by W (τ |σ′). Then the sequence of
states of the repeated game forms a Markov chain
P (σ, t+ 1) =
∑
σ
′
T
(
σ|σ′
)
P
(
σ
′
, t
)
[1]
with the transition probability
T
(
σ|σ′
)
≡
∑
τ
W
(
τ |σ′
) N∏
n=1
Tˆn
(
σn|σ
′
n, τ
)
, [2]
where P (σ, t) denotes the state distribution at time t. When
B = Σ and W (τ |σ′) = δτ,σ′ , the above formulation reduces
to that of complete-information games. Otherwise, it repre-
sents a certain type of incomplete-information games, where
players cannot directly observe actions of other players. The
model treated here can therefore be regarded as an extension
of repeated games with complete information to those with in-
complete information, and the extension includes the former
as a special case.
For each state σ, a payoff of player n is defined as sn (σ).
Let sn ≡ (sn(σ
′))
σ
′∈Σ be theM -dimensional vector represent-
ing the payoffs of player n, which we call the payoff vector of
player n. It should be noted that in the following analysis we
do not assume the payoffs to be symmetric, unless otherwise
stated.
We remark on discounting. In standard repeated games,
discounting of future payoffs is considered by introducing a
discounting factor δ ≤ 1 (1). In the original work on ZD
strategy by Press and Dyson, only the case without discount-
ing (i.e., δ = 1) was investigated (6). After their work, ZD
strategy was extended to δ < 1 case (15, 20, 21). In this
paper, we consider only the non-discounting case δ = 1.
Results
Zero-determinant strategies. In what follows, we assume that
the Markov chain defined via the transition probabilities
{T (σ|σ′)} has a unique stationary distribution, and let
P (s) (σ) denote the stationary distribution. It satisfies
P
(s) (σ) =
∑
σ
′
T
(
σ|σ′
)
P
(s)
(
σ
′
)
. [3]
Taking summation of both sides of Eq. (3) with respect to
σ−n ≡ σ\σn with an arbitrary n, we obtain
0 =
∑
σ
′
[
Tn
(
σn|σ
′
)
− δσn,σ′n
]
P
(s)
(
σ
′
)
, [4]
where we have defined
Tn
(
σn|σ
′
)
≡
∑
τ
W
(
τ |σ′
)
Tˆn
(
σn|σ
′
n, τ
)
. [5]
Regarding δσn,σ′n as representing the strategy “Repeat”,
where player n repeats the previous action with probabil-
ity one, one can readily see that Eq. (4) is an extension of
Akin’s lemma (12, 15, 22, 23), relating a player’s strategy
with the stationary distribution, to the multi-player multi-
action incomplete-information case. Letting
T˜n
(
σn|σ
′
)
≡ Tn
(
σn|σ
′
)
− δσn,σ′n , [6]
Eq. (4) means that the average of T˜n (σn|σ
′) with respect
to the stationary distribution is zero for any n and σn. We
remark that Tˆn (σn|σ
′
n, τ ), and thus Tn(σn|σ
′) as well, are
solely under control of player n. Because of the normalization
condition
∑Mn
σn=1
Tn (σn|σ
′) = 1, the relation
Mn∑
σn=1
T˜n
(
σn|σ
′
)
= 0 [7]
holds.
Let T˜n(σn) ≡ (T˜n(σn|σ
′))
σ
′∈Σ, which we call the strat-
egy vector of player n associated with action σn. (An-
other name for T˜n(σn) is the Press-Dyson vector (22).) A
strategy of player n is represented as an M × Mn matrix
Tn ≡ (T˜n(1), · · · , T˜n(Mn)) composed of the strategy vectors
for her actions σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn}. For a matrix A, let spanA
be the subspace spanned by the column vectors of A. Let
0m and 1m denote the m-dimensional zero vector and the m-
dimensional vector of all ones, respectively. From Eq. (7), one
has
Tn1Mn =
Mn∑
σn=1
T˜n(σn) = 0M [8]
for any player n, implying that the dimension of span Tn is at
most (Mn − 1).
Let ρ ≡ (P (s)(σ))σ∈Σ be the vector representation of the
stationary distribution P (s)(σ). When player n chooses a
strategy Tn, for any vector v ∈ span Tn, one has ρ
Tv = 0
due to Eq. (4). In other words, the expectation of v with
respect to the stationary distribution ρ vanishes.
Let S ≡ (1M , s1, · · · , sN ) and Vn ≡ span Tn ∩ spanS .
The following definition is an extension of the notion of the
ZD strategy (6, 22) to multi-player multi-action incomplete-
information games.
Definition 1. A zero-determinant (ZD) strategy is defined as
a strategy Tn for which dimVn ≥ 1 holds.
To see that this is indeed an extended definition of the ZD
strategy, note that any vector u ∈ spanS is represented as
u = Sα, where α ≡ (α0, α1, · · · , αN )
T is the coefficient vector.
Let e ≡ (1, e1, · · · , eN)
T = STρ be the vector with element
en equal to the expected payoff en ≡ 〈sn(σ)〉s of player n in
the steady state. When player n employs a ZD strategy, it
amounts to enforcing linear relations eTα = ρTSα = 0 on e
with α satisfying Sα ∈ Vn.
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Consistency. A question naturally arises: When more than
one of the players employ ZD strategies, are they consistent?
Let N ′ be the set of players who employ ZD strategies. The
set E ≡ {e ∈ {1} × RN : eTα = 0,∀α,Sα ∈ span(Vn)n∈N′}
consists of all combinations of the expected payoffs that sat-
isfy the enforced linear relations by the players in N ′. If E is
empty, then it implies that the set of ZD strategies is incon-
sistent in the sense that there is no valid solution of the linear
relations enforced by the players.
Definition 2. ZD strategies are said to be consistent when E
is not empty.
In the multi-player setting, one may regard N ′ as a variant
of a ZD strategy alliance (12), where the players in N ′ agree
to coordinate on the linear relations to be enforced on the
expected payoffs. The above question then amounts to asking
whether it is possible for a player to serve as a counteracting
agent who participates in the ZD strategy alliance with a
hidden intention to invalidate it by adopting a ZD strategy
that is inconsistent with others.
The following proposition is the first main result of this
paper, whose proof is given in Appendices.
Proposition 1. Any set of ZD strategies is consistent.
Proposition 1 states that it is impossible for any player
to serve as a counteracting agent to invalidate ZD strategy
alliances. This statement is quite general in that it applies to
any instance of repeated games covered by our formulation.
In Ref. (16), it was shown that every player can have at
most one master player, who can play an equalizer strategy
on the given player (that is, controlling the expected payoff of
the given player), in multi-player multi-action games. Indeed,
our general result on the absence of inconsistent ZD strategies
(Proposition 1) immediately implies that more than one ZD
players cannot simultaneously control the expected payoff of
a player to different values. Therefore, our result generalizes
their result on equalizer strategy to arbitrary ZD strategies.
Since the dimension of span Tn is at most (Mn−1), depend-
ing on S , it should be possible for player n with Mn ≥ 3 to
adopt a ZD strategy for which dimVn ≥ 2 holds. The dimen-
sion of Vn corresponds to the number of independent linear
relations to be enforced on the expected payoffs of the play-
ers, so that it implies that one player may be able to enforce
multiple independent linear relations. On the other hand, our
result on the absence of inconsistent ZD strategies implies that
for any set N ′ of ZD players the dimension of span(Vn)n∈N′
should be at most N , the number of players, since any set of
ZD strategies should contain at most N independent linear
relations if it is consistent. This in turn implies that if the
dimension of span(Vn)n∈N′ is equal to N for a subset N
′ of
players then players not in N ′ cannot employ independent ZD
strategy any more.
Independence. Another naturally-arising question would be
regarding independence for a set of ZD strategies, which we
define as follows:
Definition 3. A set {Tn}n∈N′ of ZD strategies is independent
if any set {vn}n∈N′ of non-zero vectors vn in Vn is linearly
independent. Otherwise, {Tn}n∈N′ is said to be dependent.
If a set of ZD strategies is dependent, then there exists a
ZD player whose ZD strategy adds no linear constraints other
than those already imposed by other ZD players. One of the
simplest example of a dependent set of ZD strategies is the
case where two players enforce exactly the same linear relation
to the expected payoffs. Our second main result is to show
that any set of ZD strategies is independent under a general
condition.
Proposition 2. Let N ′ be a subset of players. Assume that
T˜n(σn) does not have zero elements for any n ∈ N
′ and any
σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn}. Then, any set {Tn}n∈N′ of ZD strategies
of players in N ′ is independent.
See Appendices for the proof.
It should be noted that when T˜n(σn) has zero elements
then one might have dependent ZD strategies. A simple
example can be found in a two-player two-action complete-
information (iterated prisoner’s dilemma) game: Let the pay-
off vectors s1 and s2 for players 1 and 2 be s1 = (R,S, T, P )
T
and s2 = (R,T, S, P )
T, with T 6= S. If player 1 adopts the
strategy
T˜1(1) =


0
−1
1
0

 = 1
T − S
s1 −
1
T − S
s2, [9]
then it enforces the linear payoff relation e1 = e2. This strat-
egy is a well-known tit-for-tat strategy (6). By symmetry,
player 2 can also adopt the same strategy T˜2(1) = −T˜1(1),
implying that these two strategies are indeed dependent.
Simultaneous multiple linear relations by one player. As men-
tioned above, when the number Mn of possible actions for
player n is more than two, player n may be able to employ a
ZD strategy with dimVn ≥ 2 to simultaneously enforce more
than one linear relations. Such a possibility has never been
reported in the context of ZD strategies. Here, we provide a
simple example of such a situation in a two-player three-action
symmetric game.
We consider the 3× 3 symmetric game
s1 = (0, r1, 0, r2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T
s2 = (0, r2, 0, r1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
T
. [10]
We remark that s1, s2, and 19 are linearly independent when
r1 6= r2. We choose strategies of player 1 as
T1(1) =
(
1, 1− p, 1, p′, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)T
T1(2) =
(
0, q, 0, 1− q′, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0
)T
T1(3) =
(
0, p− q, 0, q′ − p′, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1
)T
[11]
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p′ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q′ ≤ 1, q ≤ p, and
p′ ≤ q′. Then we obtain
q′r1 + qr2
p′q − pq′
T˜1(1) +
p′r1 + pr2
p′q − pq′
T˜1(2) = s1 [12]
q′r2 + qr1
p′q − pq′
T˜1(1) +
p′r2 + pr1
p′q − pq′
T˜1(2) = s2. [13]
Therefore, player 1 can simultaneously control average payoffs
of both players, e1 and e2, as e1 = e2 = 0. Note that σ with
s1(σ) = 0 is an absorbing state regardless of the strategy of
player 2 in this case.
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In general, when one player simultaneously enforces two
linear relations in two-player multi-action symmetric games,
only e1 = e2 = C is allowed with some C. This is explained
as follows: Assume that player 1 can simultaneously enforce
e1 = C1 and e2 = C2 with C1 6= C2 by one ZD strategy. Be-
cause the game is symmetric, player 2 can also simultaneously
enforce e1 = C2 and e2 = C1 independently by one ZD strat-
egy. This contradicts the consistency of ZD strategies (Propo-
sition 1). Therefore, the only possibility is e1 = e2 = C.
The above argument can be extended straightforwardly to
the multi-player case. For that purpose, we introduce some
notions of symmetric multi-player games. The following def-
inition of a symmetric multi-player game is due to von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (24, Section 28).
Definition 4. A game is symmetric with respect to a per-
mutation pi on {1, . . . , N} if Mn = Mpi(n) holds for any
n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and if pi preserves the payoff structure of the
game, that is,
spi(n)(σ) = sn(σpi) [14]
holds for any σ ∈ Σ and for any n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where σpi ≡
(σpi(1), . . . , σpi(N)).
The following definition is due to (25).
Definition 5. A game is weakly symmetric if for any pair
of players n and n¯ there exists some permutation pi on
{1, . . . , N} satisfying pi(n) = n¯ such that the game is sym-
metric with respect to pi.
Consider an N-player weakly symmetric game. Assume
that one player simultaneously enforces N independent lin-
ear relations on the average payoffs {en}n∈{1,...,N} of N play-
ers via adopting an N-dimensional ZD strategy∗. Then, the
average payoffs {en}n∈{1,...,N} should be simultaneously con-
trolled, but they should satisfy e1 = e2 = · · · = en due to the
consistency of ZD strategies.
The difficulty of construction of a ZD strategy of one player
with dimension N in weakly symmetric N-player games can
be seen in the following two propositions, whose proofs are
given in Appendices.
Proposition 3. In a weakly symmetric N-player game, if the
strategy vectors of one player contain no zero element, then a
ZD strategy of the player with dimension N is impossible.
Proposition 4. In a weakly symmetric N-player game, if pay-
offs sn(σ) of player n are different from each other for all σ,
then a ZD strategy with dimension N is impossible.
Discussion
In this paper, we have derived ZD strategies for general multi-
player multi-action incomplete-information games, in which
players cannot observe actions of other players. By formulat-
ing ZD strategy in terms of linear algebra, we have proved
that linear payoff relations enforced by ZD players are consis-
tent. Furthermore, we have proved that linear payoff relations
enforced by players with ZD strategies are independent under
a general condition. We emphasize that these results hold not
only for incomplete-information games but also for complete-
information games. We have also provided a simple example
in which one player can simultaneously enforce more than one
∗
Note that for this to be possible the numberMn of actions should satisfyMn ≥ N + 1.
linear constraints on the expected payoffs. These results elu-
cidate constraints on ZD strategies in terms of linear algebra.
Although we have discussed mathematical properties of ZD
strategies if exist, we do not know the criterion for whether
ZD strategies exist or not when a game is given. For exam-
ple, we can easily show that ZD strategy does not exist for
the rock-paper-scissors game, which is the simplest two-player
three-action symmetric zero-sum game. Specifying a general
criterion for the existence of ZD strategies is an important
future problem.
Another remark is related to memory of strategies. In this
work, we considered only memory-one strategies. In Ref. (6),
it has been proved that a player with longer memory does not
have advantage over a player with short memory in terms of
average payoff in two-player games. In Ref. (13, 16), it has
been shown that this statement also holds for multi-player
games. Therefore, considering only memory-one strategies
should be sufficient even in our incomplete-information situa-
tion.
We remark on the effect of incomplete information. In
complete information case, the strategy vectors are arbitrary
as long as they satisfy the conditions for probability distribu-
tions. In contrast, in incomplete information case, forms of
the strategy vectors are constrained by Eq. (5). Therefore,
the space of ZD strategies for incomplete information games
is generally smaller than that for complete information games.
In SI, we provide an example of equalizer strategy in a simple
incomplete information game.
Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1.We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 1. Let T = (T1, · · · , TN). Then 1M 6∈ span T .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that v ≡ γ1M ∈ span T with
γ 6= 0. Taking the inner product of v with the stationary dis-
tribution ρ, one has ρTv = 0 since v ∈ span T is represented
as a linear combination of the strategy vectors and since the
inner product of a strategy vector and the stationary distri-
bution is zero. On the other hand, γρT1M = γ holds because
of the normalization of the stationary distribution. Therefore
we obtain γ = 0, leading to contradiction.
We return to the proof of Proposition 1. For any set
span(Vn)n∈N′ of ZD strategies, let K be the dimension of
span(Vn)n∈N′ , and let u1 = Sα1, · · · ,uK = SαK be a basis
of span(Vn)n∈N′ . The expected payoff vector e = (1, e¯
T)T
should be given by a non-zero solution of the linear equation
e¯TA¯+ bT = 0TK in e¯, where we define A, b, and A¯ as
A =
(
bT
A¯
)
≡ (α1,α2, · · · ,αK). [15]
One has
SA = (u1,u2, · · · ,uK) = 1Mb
T + S¯A¯, [16]
where S¯ ≡ (s1, · · · , sN).
The Rouché-Capelli theorem (26) tells us that rank A¯ =
rankA is a necessary and sufficient condition for the linear
equation e¯TA¯ + bT = 0TK in e¯ to have a solution, that is, for
span(Vn)n∈N′ to be consistent. An equivalent expression of
this condition is that there is no vector c ∈ RK such that
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A¯c = 0N and b
Tc 6= 0 hold. Assume to the contrary that
there exist c ∈ RK such that A¯c = 0N and b
Tc 6= 0 hold.
One would then have
SAc = 1Mb
T
c+ S¯A¯c = (bTc)1M . [17]
On the other hand, SAc =
∑K
k=1
ckuk is a linear combination
of u1, · · · ,uK ∈ span(Vn)n∈N′ ⊂ span T , so that Lemma 1
states that it should be zero if it is proportional to 1M , leading
to contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let N ′ be a subset of players. Assume that T˜n(σn)
does not have zero elements for any n ∈ N ′ and any σn ∈
{1, . . . ,Mn}. For n ∈ N
′, let vn be an arbitrary non-zero
vector in span Tn. Then {vn}n∈N′ are linearly independent.
Proof. We assume to the contrary that {vn}n∈N′ are linearly
dependent. Then there is a set of coefficients {an}n∈N′ with
which
∑
n∈N′
anvn = 0M holds. Without loss of generality
we assume an 6= 0 for n ∈ N
′.
Since vn ∈ span Tn, it is expressed as vn = Tncn
with a non-zero vector cn = (cn,1, . . . , cn,Mn)
T. Let σ˜n ≡
argminσn∈{1,...,Mn}{ancn,σn}, where ties may be broken arbi-
trarily, and c˜n ≡ cn,σ˜n . With Eq. (8), one obtains
vn = Tn(cn − c˜n1Mn), [18]
and thus
anvn(σ
′) =
Mn∑
σn=1
an(cn,σn − c˜n)T˜n(σn|σ
′). [19]
We show that the inequality
an(cn,σn − c˜n)T˜n(σn|σ
′) ≥ 0 [20]
holds for any n, any σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn}, and any σ
′ ∈ Σ
satisfying σ′n = σ˜n. We first note that for any strategy vector
T˜n(σn) with action σn ∈ {1, · · · ,Mn}, one has, from Eq. (6),
T˜n(σn|σ
′)
{
≤ 0, σ′n = σn,
≥ 0, σ′n 6= σn.
[21]
Fix any σ′ ∈ Σ satisfying σ′n = σ˜n for a moment. Then, for
σn = σ˜n one has cn,σn = c˜n by definition, making the left-
hand side of Eq. (20) equal to zero. For σn 6= σ˜n, on the
other hand, one has an(cn,σn − c˜n) ≥ 0 by definition. Also,
since σ′n = σ˜n 6= σn, from Eq. (21) one has T˜n(σn|σ
′) ≥ 0.
These imply that the inequality Eq. (20) holds for σn 6= σ˜n.
Putting the above arguments together, we have shown that
the inequality Eq. (20) holds for any n, any σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn},
and any σ′ ∈ Σ satisfying σ′n = σ˜n.
Fix any σ′ ∈ Σ satisfying σ′n = σ˜n for all n ∈ N
′. The
above argument has shown that the inequality Eq. (20) holds
for any n and any σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn}. On the other hand, at
the beginning of the proof we have assumed that
∑
n∈N′
anvn(σ
′) =
∑
n∈N′
Mn∑
σn=1
an(cn,σn−c˜n)T˜n(σn|σ
′) = 0 [22]
holds, implying that the summand an(cn,σn − c˜n)T˜n(σn|σ
′)
is equal to zero for any n ∈ N ′ and any σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn}.
By assumption, an 6= 0 and T˜n(σn|σ
′) 6= 0, so that one has
cn,σn = c˜n, and consequently, vn = c˜nTn1Mn = 0M , leading
to contradiction.
The proof of Proposition 2 is immediate by taking vn as
belonging to S in Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider an N-player game which is symmet-
ric with respect to a permutation pi on {1, . . . , N}. Assume
that the column vectors of S are linearly independent. For
any pair of players n and n¯ satisfying n 6= pi(n¯), if the
strategy vectors of these players contain no zero element,
then it is impossible for these players to adopt ZD strategies
with which player n enforces linear relation eTα = 0 with
α 6= 0N+1, and where player n¯ enforces e
Tαpi = 0, where
αpi ≡ (α0, αpi(1), . . . , αpi(N))
T.
Proof. We assume to the contrary that there exists α 6= 0N+1
satisfying the properties stated in Lemma 3. By assumption,
Sα ∈ Vn = span Tn∩spanS and Sαpi ∈ Vn¯ = span Tn¯∩spanS .
There then exist cn and c¯n¯ satisfying Tncn = Sα and Tn¯c¯n¯ =
Sαpi. One has
(Sαpi)(σ
′
pi) = α0 +
N∑
n=1
αpi(n)sn(σ
′
pi)
= α0 +
N∑
n=1
αpi(n)spi(n)(σ
′) = (Sα)(σ′), [23]
where the second equality is due to the assumed symme-
try of the game with respect to pi. Letting T˜n¯,pi(σn¯|σ
′) ≡
T˜n¯(σn¯|σ
′
pi), T˜n¯,pi(σn¯) ≡ (T˜n¯,pi(σn¯|σ
′)), and Tn¯,pi ≡
(T˜n¯,pi(1), . . . , T˜n¯,pi(Mn¯)), one has
(Tn¯,pi c¯n¯)(σ
′) = (Tn¯c¯n¯)(σ
′
pi) = (Sαpi)(σ
′
pi)
= (Sα)(σ′) = (Tncn)(σ
′), [24]
implying that Tn¯,pi c¯n¯ = Tncn holds. Let v = Tncn = Tn¯,pi c¯n¯.
Let σn,max = argmaxσn cn,σn and σ¯n¯,min =
argminσn¯ c¯n¯,σn¯ , where ties may be broken arbitrarily,
and cn,max = cn,σn,max and c¯n¯,min = c¯n¯,σ¯n,min . One then has
v = Tn(cn − cn,max1Mn) = Tn¯,pi(c¯n¯ − c¯n¯,min1Mn¯). [25]
Recalling that we have assumed n 6= pi(n¯), let σ′ ∈ Σ be an
arbitrary state satisfying σ′n = σn,max and σ
′
pi(n¯) = σ¯n¯,min.
Then, in view of Eq. (21), one has
v(σ′) =
Mn∑
σn=1
(cn,σn − cn,max)T˜n(σn|σ
′) ≤ 0,
=
Mn¯∑
σn¯=1
(c¯n¯,σn¯ − c¯n¯,min)T˜n¯(σn¯|σ
′
pi) ≥ 0, [26]
implying that v(σ′) = 0 holds. Since (cn,σn −
cn,max)T˜n(σn|σ
′) ≤ 0 for all σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn}, they are
all equal to zero. Since T˜n(σn|σ
′) is assumed non-zero, one
has cn,σn = cn,max for all σn ∈ {1, . . . ,Mn} and conse-
quently cn ∝ 1Mn . One similarly has c¯n¯ ∝ 1Mn¯ . Therefore,
from Eq. (8) one has Tncn = Tn¯c¯n¯ = 0M . Due to the assump-
tion of linear independence of the columns of S , it in turn
implies that α = 0N+1 holds, leading to contradiction.
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It should be noted that Lemma 3 holds even if one takes
n¯ = n, in which case the Lemma implies that, if the game is
symmetric with respect to pi, player n with pi(n) 6= n cannot
enforce linear relations eTα = eTαpi = 0 simultaneously. It
should also be noted that Lemma 3 furthermore implies that
it is impossible for that player to enforce a linear relation
eTα = 0 satisfying αpi = α 6= 0N+1. In other words, in a
symmetric game no player to whom the game is symmetric
can enforce a linear relation with the same symmetry as the
game itself.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 in weakly
symmetric multi-player games.
Proof of Proposition 4.Without loss of generality, we assume
that player k takes an N-dimensional ZD strategy determin-
ing the average payoffs en for n = 1, · · · , N . Due to the
above discussion, only e1 = · · · = eN = C is allowed. Let-
ting α(n) ≡ (−C, 0, · · · , 1
n̂
, · · · , 0)T for n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, one
can take {Sα(n)}n∈{1,...,N} as a basis of the N-dimensional
ZD strategy. Let c(n) be defined as
Tkc
(n) = Sα(n) = sn − C1M , n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. [27]
By the assumption of weak symmetry, for any player n 6= k,
there exists a permutation pi satisfying pi(n) = k such that the
game is symmetric with respect to pi. Noting thatα
(n)
pi = α
(k),
from Eq. (23) one has
(Tkc
(k))(σ′pi) = (Tkc
(n))(σ′). [28]
For n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, define σ
(n)
max ≡ argmaxσk c
(n)
σk and
σ
(n)
min ≡ argminσk c
(n)
σk , where ties may be broken arbitrar-
ily provided that σ
(n)
max 6= σ
(n)
min holds, and c
(n)
max = c
(n)
σmax and
c
(n)
min = c
(n)
σmin . From Eq. (7), one has
Tkc
(n) = Tk
(
c
(n) − c(n)max1Mk
)
= Tk
(
c
(n) − c
(n)
min1Mk
)
. [29]
Then, from Eq. (28) and Eq. (21), we obtain for an arbitrary
σ∗ satisfying σ∗k = σ
(n)
max and σ
∗
n = σ
(k)
min
sn (σ
∗)−C =
(
Tk
(
c
(n) − c(n)max1Mk
))
(σ∗) ≤ 0 [30]
=
(
Tk
(
c
(k) − c
(k)
min1Mk
))
(σ∗pi) ≥ 0 [31]
implying sn (σ
∗) = C. On the other hand, we also obtain for
an arbitrary σ∗∗ satisfying σ∗∗k = σ
(n)
min and σ
∗∗
n = σ
(k)
max
sn (σ
∗∗)− C =
(
Tk
(
c
(n) − c
(n)
min1Mk
))
(σ∗∗) ≥ 0 [32]
=
(
Tk
(
c
(k) − c(k)max1Mk
))
(σ∗∗pi ) ≤ 0 [33]
implying sn (σ
∗∗) = C. Then, because we have assumed that
all elements of the payoff vector sn are different from each
other, we have arrived at a contradiction.
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Supplemental Information
ZD strategy in incomplete information game. As an example of ZD
strategy for a repeated incomplete-information game, we consider a
two-player two-action symmetric game (27). We assume τ ∈ {1, 2}
and the probability W (τ |σ′) is given by
W (1|1, 1) =
1
2
, [S1]
W (1|1, 2) = w, [S2]
W (1|2, 1) = 1− w, [S3]
W (1|2, 2) =
1
2
. [S4]
This model is different from the noisy games studied by Hao et
al. (17), in that they consider τ as noisy states, taking four values
τ ∈ {gg, gb, bg, bb} corresponding to the four states in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game, whereas ours considers τ as taking only
two values, representing winning/losing of player 1. The payoff
vectors are given by s1 = (R, S, T, P )
T and s2 = (R, T, S, P )
T. We
consider equalizer strategy for player 1:
T˜1(1) = βs2 + γ14. [S5]
This strategy unilaterally sets the average payoff of player 2 in the
steady state:
〈s2〉s = −
γ
β
. [S6]
By solving Eq. (S5) with respect to Tˆn (σn|σ′n, τ), we obtain
Tˆ1 (1|1, 1) =
2(1 −w)R− T
1− 2w
β + γ + 1, [S7]
Tˆ1 (1|1, 2) =
T − 2wR
1− 2w
β + γ + 1, [S8]
Tˆ1 (1|2, 1) =
S − 2wP
1− 2w
β + γ, [S9]
Tˆ1 (1|2, 2) =
2(1 −w)P − S
1− 2w
β + γ. [S10]
Concretely, we consider w = 1/5 and (R, S, T, P ) =
(4, 1, 9/2, 3/2). By setting β = −3/125 and γ = 33/500, we ob-
tain
Tˆ1 (1|1, 1) =
99
100
, [S11]
Tˆ1 (1|1, 2) =
95
100
, [S12]
Tˆ1 (1|2, 1) =
5
100
, [S13]
Tˆ1 (1|2, 2) =
1
100
, [S14]
and
〈s2〉s =
11
4
. [S15]
In Fig. S1, we display the result of numerical simula-
tion of one sample. Time-averaged payoffs of two players∑t
t′=1
sn (σ1(t′), σ2(t′)) /t are displayed when the strategy of
player 2 is all-1:
Tˆ2 (1|1, 1) = 1 [S16]
Tˆ2 (1|1, 2) = 1 [S17]
Tˆ2 (1|2, 1) = 1 [S18]
Tˆ2 (1|2, 2) = 1. [S19]
The initial condition is set to σ1(0) = 1 and σ2(0) = 1. The numer-
ical result for player 2 well matches with the theoretical prediction
Eq. (S15). We can see that the expected payoff of player 2 is
unilaterally controlled by the ZD strategy of player 1.
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Fig. S1. Time-averaged payoffs of two players
∑
t
t′=1
sn
(
σ1(t
′), σ2(t
′)
)
/t.
The solid line corresponds to the theoretical prediction Eq. (S15) for player 2’s ex-
pected payoff.
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